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AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: WITH GREAT
POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY
Cynthia Gray*
I. INTRODUCTION
If a judge tells a police officer who stopped him for a traffic offense
that his arrest is unnecessary because "we need each other," the judge
clearly violates the proscription on using the prestige of judicial office to
advance the judge's private interests.' But is it a violation if the judge sim-
ply shows the officer a judicial identification card instead of a driver's li-
cense without expressly asking for or demanding favorable treatment? 2 A
judge's call advising an assistant prosecutor to be more emotional in front of
the jury in a sexual assault trial is an obvious, prohibited ex parte communica-
tion.3 But if the judge simply meets privately with some attorneys in chain-
* Since October 1990, Cindy has been director of the American Judicature Society's
Center for Judicial Ethics, a national clearinghouse for information about judicial ethics and
discipline. She summarizes recent cases and advisory opinions, answers requests for infor-
mation about judicial conduct, writes and edits the Judicial Conduct Reporter, and directs the
Center's day-to-day activities and special projects. She has made numerous presentations at
judicial education programs on judicial ethics topics. Most recently, she is author of Reach-
ing Out of Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants, "The Line Be-
tween Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Ac-
countability," Hofstra Law Review (Summer 2004), and Ethics and Judges' Evolving Roles
Off the Bench: Service on Governmental Commissions, A Study of Judicial Discipline Sanc-
tions. She has also written An Ethics Guide for Judges and Their Families and the related
discussion guide; When Judges Speak Up: Ethics, the Public, and the Media; An Ethics
Guide for Part-Time Lawyer Judges; Communicating with Voters: Ethics and Judicial Cam-
paign Speech; Ethics Training for Non-Lawyer Judges; the Handbook for Judicial Conduct
Commission Members; and eight background papers on key issues in judicial ethics. She is
also co-author of the Judicial Conduct and Ethics Curriculum. A 1980 graduate of the
Northwestern University School of Law, Cindy clerked for Judge Hubert L. Will of the
United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois for two years and was a litiga-
tion attorney in two private law firms for eight years.
1. When the officer was not deterred, the judge warned the officer to "watch out from
here on in." In re Winkworth, Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Sept. 23,
1992), at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/w/winkworth.htm (admonition for this
misconduct and driving while impaired).
2. In re Werner, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 1, 2002) at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/w/wemer.htm (admonition pursuant to agreement
for handing over license and court identification card when stopped by officer for speeding);
In re Heiple, Order (Ill. Courts Comm'n Apr. 30, 1997) (censure for four traffic stops in which
the justice failed to cooperate with and disobeyed law enforcement officials and volunteered the
information that he was a member of the judiciary).
3. In re Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147, 148-49 (W. Va. 1995) (reprimand). The judge also
advised the prosecutor to have supporters present in the courtroom during closing argument and
to use the term "serial rapist" frequently. The telephone call had been overheard by a law firm
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bers just before they are to appear in his court and no one overhears the
conversation, is it reasonable to assume no ex parte communications took
place and there was no violation?4 A judge who solicits bribes before im-
properly disposing of matters unquestionably commits a violation of the code
of judicial conduct as well as a crime. 5 But is there an ethical breach if a judge
initiates business transactions with a litigant and gets favorable terms after
rendering a large monetary judgment?6
To hold judges to the highest standards of ethical conduct, a code of
judicial conduct must cover not just the clear and obvious improprieties but
indirect, disguised, or careless conduct that looks like an impropriety to an
observer who is informed and thoughtful but not prescient or gullible. Thus,
much of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct 7 is
based on reasonable assumptions about a judge's impartiality based on the
judge's conduct. For example, a judge may be capable of rendering unbi-
ased decisions even if he belongs to a discriminatory organization, but
rather than asking the public to take that on faith, judges are prohibited from
belonging to organizations that practice invidious discrimination.8 Similarly,
a judge may be able to render a fair decision even if her nephew is the attor-
ney in the case, but rather than give the parties a basis for questioning the
decision, the judge is required to disqualify.9
In addition, the code of judicial conduct provides in Canon 2 that "a
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities," defining an "appearance of impropriety" in commentary
as conduct that "would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
associate who was sitting in a room adjoining Judge Starcher's chambers when she became
aware of a telephone conversation between the judge and the assistant prosecuting attorney
about a criminal trial in which the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting several
female students at West Virginia University. The judge admitted that the conversation oc-
curred. Id.
4. Kennick v. Comm 'n on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1990). For further
discussion of this case, see infra accompanying text at notes 146-47.
5. See, e.g., In re Jenkins, 465 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. 1991).
6. See Adams v. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, 897 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1995) (removal for
this and other misconduct). For a further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 80-90.
7. References to the code of judicial conduct and to canons or sections of the code are
to the 1990 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The 1990 model
code retained most of the basic principles of the 1972 ABA model code but made several
substantive changes and contains many differences in its details. Although the model code is
not binding on judges unless it has been adopted in their jurisdiction, forty-nine states, the
United States Judicial Conference, and the District of Columbia have adopted codes of judi-
cial conduct based on either the 1972 or 1990 model codes. (Montana has rules of conduct
for judges, but they are not based on either model code.)
8. Canon 2C ("A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin").
9. Canon 3E(l)(d). The parties may waive that disqualification. Canon 3F.
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judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartial-
ity and competence is impaired."' 0 The reasonable person standard is also
present in code sections requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself
from a case when the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned," 1'1 and requiring a judge to conduct all extra-judicial activities so that
they do not "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially
as a judge."'' 2
Some critics have argued that the appearance of impropriety standard
is at best merely aspirational and at worse unconstitutionally vague and in
either case out of place in a code used as the basis for disciplinary sanctions
of judges. Several groups, although none comprised solely or even largely
of judges, have asked the ABA to eliminate the standard from the model
code in its current revision process.
3
Canon 2, however, is a vital component of the code of judicial conduct.
As the case-law analysis in this article will demonstrate, judicial discipline
authorities are not using the standard as an arbitrary smell test but are apply-
ing it in a cautious, reasoned, and appropriate manner with no evidence of
overly subjective interpretation. This article will also examine the criticisms
of the standard. The article concludes that the standard is not too vague to
follow and that, given their power and prestige, requiring judges to consider
10. All states but Oregon and Montana refer to the appearance of impropriety in their
codes of conduct.
11. Canon 3E(l). This article will focus on cases other than those involving disqualifi-
cation. For a discussion of the application of the appearance of impartiality standard for
disqualification, see Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a
Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHicS 55 (Fall
2000).
12. Canon 4A(1).
13. See Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff, Secretary, Association of Professional Respon-
sibility Lawyers, to ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(June 30, 2004), at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/commrulesminkoff_063004.pdf [hereinaf-
ter APRL comments]; Memorandum from Charles E. McCallum, Chair, ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, to Mark I. Harrison, Chair, ABA
Commission on Evaluation of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Apr. 12, 2005), at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/commrules aba ethics%20committee_4125
_ddt.pdf. In September 2003, the ABA appointed a Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct to review the ABA's Model Code and to recommend revisions.
The Commission has held public hearings across the country in 2004-2005 and released
several drafts. A preliminary report was released for comment in June 2005, and a final re-
port will be considered by the ABA House of Delegates in 2006. See
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/home.html. Although in partial drafts, the ABA Joint
Commission watered down the "appearance of impropriety" standard, in the preliminary
draft, it left the standard essentially unchanged from the 1990 model code, noting that the
"[m]ajority of commentators on the subject, citing to judicial discipline decided over a three-
decade period, urged that the concept be retained."
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the implications of their conduct for public confidence in the judiciary is not
too much to ask and, indeed, is a responsibility most judges readily assume.
II. APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AS AN ASPIRATIONAL STANDARD
The code of judicial conduct is not simply a penal provision, threaten-
ing judges with the possibility of disciplinary sanction, but an important
reminder to them of the ethical foundations of their role in a free society.
The appearance of impropriety standard is "peculiar to the judiciary"'14 be-
cause judges have a peculiar position in the American system; they are re-
quired to make decisions that sometimes many members of the public will
challenge and at all times at least one party will dispute. Although judges
must ignore public clamor about the substance of their decisions, they can-
not afford a callousness toward public opinion about their integrity and im-
partiality based on the choices they make about their conduct.
Moreover, incorporating those values in the code of judicial conduct-
which is adopted by the state supreme courts-announces to citizens that
judges are willing to hold themselves to very demanding ethical standards in
light of the power they are given over others' lives.
Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important to developing
public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impropriety itself. The re-
sponsibility of the judge extends not only to the business of the courts in
its technical sense, such as the disposition of cases, but also to the busi-
ness of the judge in an institutional sense, such as the avoidance of any
stigma, disrepute, or other element of loss of public esteem and confi-
dence in respect to the court system from the actions of a judge.15
The appearance of impropriety standard does not unfairly assume that
judges lack integrity, but the alternative of asking the public simply to trust
that judges are upright despite appearances 16 ignores the public's suspicions
14. In re Spector, 392 N.E.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. 1979).
15. In re Dean, 717 A.2d 176, 185 (Conn. 1998).
16. Judge Alex Kozinski, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
for example, has argued:
I know there's a growing tendency to distrust judges-to craft more elaborate
ethical rules and restrictions, to expand the scope of what is encompassed within
the appearance of impropriety standard, to adopt better methods of intruding into
judges' private lives-all in a misguided effort to promote ethical judicial behav-
ior. But the hard truth is that few of those things really matter. Judicial ethics,
where it counts, is often hidden from view, and no rule can possibly ensure ethi-
cal judicial conduct. Ultimately, there is no choice but to trust the judges. To my
mind, we'd all be better off in a world with fewer rules and a more clear-cut un-
derstanding that impartiality and diligence are obligations that permeate every
[Vol. 28
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about public officials in general as well as judges, suspicions that unfortu-
nately have been confirmed and aggravated by scandal after scandal, some
of which have involved judges. A reasonable level of cynicism by members
of the public is justified; it would be nafve and foolish for citizens to blindly
trust any public official, and it would imprudent for judges to assume, as-
sert, or act as if they should be exempt from that skepticism.
All public servants are as a practical matter held to an appearance of
impropriety standard by the press and public if not by a code of conduct.
Reflecting that unofficial gauge, Canon 2 reminds judges to think carefully
about what they say and do and to consider the perspective of a reasonable
person who does not know them well. That is not bad advice for everyone,
and it is a critical factor in maintaining public confidence in an individual
judge and the judiciary in general.
III. APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AS A DISCIPLINARY STANDARD
The appearance of impropriety standard is necessary and justified even
if the code is viewed only from a disciplinary perspective. Although in most
judicial discipline cases, a judge is charged with violating a specific canon
such as the prohibition on ex parte communications, there are cases based
on findings of an appearance of a violation. Most appearance cases fall into
several categories.
A. Use of Influence: Winks and Nods
Invoking the judicial office to cajole or bully a favor is a classic exam-
ple of judicial misconduct, giving rise to numerous judicial discipline
cases. 17 If the pressure is express and the favor is granted, the improper use
aspect of judicial life---obligations that each judge has the unflagging responsi-
bility to police for himself.
Alex Kozinski, The Appearance ofImpropriety, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan.-Feb. 2005), available
at http:www.legalaffairs.org/issues/JanuaryFebruary2005/argument-Kozinskijanfeb05.msp.
But see M. Margaret McKeown, Canon Fodder, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May-June 2005), available
at http://www.legal affairs.org/issues/May-June 2005/letters mayjun05.msp.
17. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Platt, Decision and Order (Cal. Comn'n on Jud. Per-
formance Aug. 5, 2002) available at http://cps.ca.gov/cn%20removals/Platt%208-5-02.rtf
(asking another judge to release on her own recognizance the daughter of a family from the
judge's church); Inquiry Concerning Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2002) (requesting
scheduling favor from another judge for family member); In re Parros, 847 So. 2d 1178 (La.
2003) (intervening on behalf of niece with prosecuting attorney, presiding judge in her felony
theft case, and victim's father); Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Brown, 761 So. 182 (Miss.
2000) (contacting officer who arrested son for DUI and asking judge assigned to son's case
for help getting the case dismissed); In re Bowers, Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud.
Conduct Nov. 12, 2004) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (stating in letter to another judge
on judicial stationery about a ticket received by an acquaintance "if you can help out I would
2005]
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of the prestige of office and the violation of the code of judicial conduct are
obvious. 18
More subtle, less bald-faced but still manifest attempts to gain an im-
proper advantage from the judicial office are captured by the appearance of
impropriety standard and represent the largest number of cases finding an
appearance of impropriety. This application of the appearance standard re-
flects the reasonable person's understanding that much of human communi-
cation is unspoken, between-the-lines, with winks and nods, and depends on
what goes without saying. Gratuitous references to the judicial office, for
example, have been held to impliedly but obviously and inappropriately
invoke the prestige of the office even absent an express request for favor-
able treatment.
For example, in In re Collester,'9 the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
sidered a judge who, stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, told
the trooper that he was a superior court judge when asked for his driving
credentials and repeated the statement during the field sobriety tests. The
court found that the judge's "'references to his judicial status gave the im-
pression that he was entitled to some special preference.' He thus clearly
used the prestige and weight of his judicial office to try to gain some per-
sonal advantage. 2 °
appreciate this, and if not, I will understand"); In re Canary, Determination (N. Y. State
Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Dec. 26, 2002) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us/determinations
(angrily disputing traffic tickets issued to the judge's son with police officer and his superior;
intervening in son's second arrest); In re Leonard, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on
Jud. Conduct Dec. 26, 2002) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (acting as advocate with
police officer for grandson and asking why she had not been given advance notice of a
search); In re Magill, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 6, 2004)
available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (interjecting judicial prestige into case in which wife was
complaining witness); In re Martin, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct
Dec. 26, 2001) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (letters seeking special consideration on
behalf of defendants awaiting sentencing in other courts on judicial stationery); In re Wil-
liams, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct May 17, 2002) (asking another
judge to vacate an order of protection entered against friend) at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us;
In re Berkhimer, 828 P.2d 19 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Dis. 2003) (calling police officer about driving
while intoxicated charge against someone else, leading officer to withdraw charges); In re
Kelly, 757 A.2d 456 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Dis. June 29, 2000 and August 23, 2000) (contacting
another judge about a friend's traffic violation, stating "I would appreciate your help not
guilty he is a great guy he can help you, come through me I don't ask to much").
18. Canon 2B provides in part that "a judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office
to advance the private interests of the judge or others."
19. 599 A.2d 1275 (N.J. 1992).
20. Id. at 1278. The judge was suspended for two months without pay for his second
DWI violation as well as informing the arresting officer that he was a judge and falsely stat-
ing that he was responding to an emergency at the courthouse. See also In re Travis, Order
(I11. Ct. Comm'n Feb. 21, 2003) (one-month suspension for, in addition to other misconduct,
showing badge that said "judge" to police officer and telling officer he was a judge); In re
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In a different context but with a similar conclusion, the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct found that, regardless of intent, a
judge's repeated, pointed references to his judicial status during a dispute
with a snowmobile dealer created the appearance that he was attempting to
use his judicial prestige to further his personal interests.2 1 The judge had
identified himself as a judge while talking to a salesman, a secretary, the
manager, and the proprietor even though his judicial status was irrelevant to
whether he was entitled to be reimbursed for repairs to his snowmobile.
When refused reimbursement, the judge stated he would take the matter to
small claims court and that he knew how "the system" worked. When he did
file suit, he left his business card with the clerk of the court and introduced
himself to a judge of the court where the case was pending. Finally, he iden-
tified himself as a judge when he made a complaint about the dealership to a
state agency. The Commission found that the judge's statements "could well
be perceived as intimidating, especially in the context of demanding reim-
bursement for the repairs, threatening a lawsuit and saying that he knew
how 'the system' worked. 22
Moreover, in the context of legal proceedings, an attempt to influence
is inherent in even a simple inquiry from a judge to an individual such as a
police officer, prosecutor, or other judge who is aware of the inquirer's ju-
dicial status. Any communication from a judge in that situation may be per-
ceived as "backed by the power and prestige of judicial office" 23 and consti-
tute an implied request for a favor.
In In re Snow,24 after his brother was cited for speeding, Judge Snow
called the police officer who had issued the summons and remarked that it
was funny that the officer had not recognized his brother because the officer
Werner, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 1, 2002) available at
http://scjc.state.ny.us (admonishment pursuant to agreement for showing official identifica-
tion card when stopped by police for traffic offenses even absent explicit request for special
consideration); In re Cipolla, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 1,
2002) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (censure for, in addition to other misconduct, dis-
playing an identification card and badge that identified him as- an acting judge during a dis-
pute with a club doorman when the doorman had not asked for identification); In re Esposito,
Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n Sept. 19, 2003) available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (cen-
sure pursuant to agreement for, in addition to other misconduct, referring to his judicial of-
fice while complaining to tax assessor about the assessment of property owned by the wife of
a former colleague with whom he had a contentious relationship); In re Krauciunas, Deter-
mination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Nov. 18, 2002) available at
http://scjc.state.ny.us (admonition for being rude and gratuitously referring to judicial office
while dealing with other judge and clerk about daughter's small claims case).
21. In re Dumar, Determination available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (N.Y. State Comm'n
on Jud. Conduct May 18, 2004).
22. Id. The Commission censured the judge pursuant to an agreement. Id.
23. In re Lonschein, 408 N.E.2d 901, 902 (N.Y. 1980).
24. 674 A.2d 573 (N.H. 1996).
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had helped his brother paint the judge's house the previous summer.2 ' The
officer told the judge that if he had known the driver was the judge's
brother, he would probably have only issued a warning.26 Although Judge
Snow told the officer that he was not calling to fix the ticket, the ticket was
thrown away when the judge's brother, at the judge's direction, brought the
summons to the police station.
27
Rejecting the judge's argument that he did not engage in serious mis-
conduct because he did not intend to fix his brother's ticket, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that "[t]here is no intent requirement
in these canons," and "in fact, it is practically impossible to impose a mens
rea element on the 'appearance of impropriety' standard in Canon 2. "28 The
court stated that "[e]ven assuming that Judge Snow was not subjectively
aware of the impropriety of his telephone call at the time that he made it,
Judge Snow should have known that his actions would create the appear-
ance of impropriety.
29
As Snow demonstrates, the appearance of influence is created even if
the judge tells the contact that he or she is not seeking favorable treatment.
In a similar case, Judge Pennington met with the county district attorney to
review a charge against his sons; the charge was dismissed for lack of
prosecution, which suggested that the judge's advocacy was successful. 30
The judge had told the district attorney that he was there as the defendant's
father and not to use his position to ask for any favors, but in discipline pro-
ceedings, the judge "acknowledged that the mere fact of his judicial status
increased the likelihood that he could not only obtain such a meeting, but
get the District Attorney's 'heightened attention' to his concerns about his
son's treatment.",3' The New York Commission concluded the contact was
prohibited by "well-established ethical standards" even in the absence of a
specific request for special consideration. 32
Proof that the judge's conduct actually resulted in inappropriate influ-
ence is not necessary to prove an appearance of influence. In In re Chais-
son,33 Judge Chaisson had promised a litigant that "he would check on the
status of a settlement" being negotiated for a $15 million judgment against
the state for injuries that had left the litigant a quadriplegic.34 While in the
25. Id. at 574-75.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 578. The court suspended the judge for six months without pay.
30. In re Pennington, Determination available at http://scjc.state.ny.us (N.Y. State
Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Nov. 3, 2003).
31. Id.
32. Id. The judge was censured pursuant to an agreement for this and other misconduct.
33. 549 So. 2d 259 (La. 1989).
34. Id. at 261.
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state capitol regarding a judicial salary bill, the judge asked the state offi-
cials handling the settlement negotiations about the figures on the table.
35
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that there was no evidence that Judge
Chaisson actually influenced the settlement. Therefore, the judge had not
used the prestige of his office to advance the litigant's interests.Y
The court, however, did not end the inquiry there but proceeded to
consider whether the judge's inquiry would raise a reasonable person's sus-
picions that he had lent the prestige of his office to advance the litigant's
interests.37 The court noted "it was highly unlikely that an ordinary citizen
claiming to be a friend of [the litigant] would have been made privy to the
details of the settlement negotiations."
38
[S]ince the matter settled on terms favorable to [the litigant] shortly after
Judge Chaisson's involvement, a reasonable person might well suspect
that this was the result of some improper influence. This suspicion is
made even more reasonable by the fact that the true nature of Judge Cha-
isson's involvement was not public and thus even more likely to be per-
ceived as wrongdoing. These factors alone are sufficient to establish the
appearance of impropriety that weakens "public confidence in the integ-
rity of the judiciary.... ,39
35. Id. at 262.




39. Chaisson, 549 So. 2d at 263. See also Inquiry Concerning Simpson, Decision and
Order (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance Dec. 9, 2002) available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCenureRTF/Simpson%20Decision%2012-9-02.rtf (censure of retired
judge pursuant to agreement for asking a court commissioner question about tickets issued to
three friends or relatives of friends; calling a commissioner about a ticket received by a
friend; asking a police officer); Inquiry Concerning Block, Decision and Order (Cal.
Comm'n on Jud. Performance Dec. 9, 2002) available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Block%20Decision%2012-09-02.rtf (censure of retired
judge pursuant to consent for expressing concern to managing judge about way ticket for
friend's daughter had been handled); Inquiry Concerning Platt, Decision and Order (Cal.
Comm'n on Jud. Performance Aug. 5, 2002) available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Platt/o208-5-02.rtf (removal for, in addition to other
misconduct, calling a court commissioner to learn how his godfather might go about getting
his ticket on the calendar); In the Inquiry Relating to Alvord, 847 P.2d 1310 (Kan. 1993)
(censure for, in addition to other misconduct, making two unsolicited phone calls on behalf of
a clerk to a prosecutor asking if anything could be done about a ticket although there was no
actual use of influence attempted by the judge and none was perceived by the prosecutor); In
re Young, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Dec. 29, 2000) available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (censure pursuant to agreement for telling a hearing examiner
that a friend's ex-husband was a "hard ass" and was being "unreasonable" by not contribut-
ing to the college expenses of one of their children); In re Whelan, Determination (N.Y. State
Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Dec. 27, 2001) available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (admoni-
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The use of judicial letterhead also inherently and inevitably creates the
appearance of a misuse of the prestige of office. When a justice of the
Alaska Supreme Court sent three letters on chambers stationery to the coun-
sel for a state agency regarding litigation in which the justice was involved
as a private citizen, the court found that a reasonably objective person
would believe that the justice was attempting "to influence opposing coun-
sel and other viewers of the letters or that it had this effect. ''4°
The court noted that the judge easily could have avoided risking a
negative effect on the confidence of the public by using different station-
ery.4' The court also concluded that whether the recipients of the letters
were influenced by the stationery was irrelevant to the opinions of the think-
ing public who might see the letters.42
The judge in In re Mosley43 sent two letters on court letterhead to his
son's school asking that the school prohibit his ex-girlfriend (his son's
mother) from visiting the boy at school. The judge argued that he had not
misused the prestige of office because the school principals already knew he
was a judge and did not provide special treatment to him.44 Rejecting that
argument, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that an objective reason-
able person could conclude that the judge used his judicial letterhead in an
attempt to gain a personal advantage.45
tion pursuant to agreement for urging attorney to convince clients to pay bill related to real
estate transaction handled by judge's spouse); In re Looper, 548 S.E.2d 219 (S.C. 2001)
(reprimand of former judge pursuant to consent for communicating with another judge to
ensure that judge was aware of his personal interest in pending case). But see Inquiry Con-
cerning Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2002) (request to a police detective conducting a
criminal investigation of allegations involving a family friend keeping her apprised of devel-
opments in the case was "not, in itself, sufficient to conclude that the judge is abusing her
office").
40. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Alaska 1991).
41. Id. at 1341. Rejecting the justice's argument that it was not official stationery and
the court system had no written policy restricting the use of chambers stationery, the court
found that "an objectively reasonable person would not know the difference between the two
types of stationery or whether any policy existed" and individual judges have an obligation to
follow ethical constraints notwithstanding any court system policy or lack of policy. Id. at
1340-41.
42. Id. However, rejecting the Commission's finding, the court concluded that a rea-
sonably objective person would not believe that an impropriety was afoot from the justice's
identification of himself as a "justice" when calling the governor because in the same con-
versation he stated he was calling on a personal matter. Id. at 1341. The justice was privately
reprimanded for meeting with the governor and using judicial stationery to communicate
with opposing counsel in a private lawsuit. See id.
43. 102 P.3d 555 (Nev. 2004).
44. Id. at 559.
45. Id. The judge had been awarded custody of the boy after a bitter battle with his ex-
girlfriend. The judge was censured and fined $5,000 for this and other misconduct. See also
In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct June 21, 2002) available at
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The Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct found that a
judge's inquiry to an attorney about a campaign sign endorsing his opponent
in front of the attorney's office could reasonably be perceived as an attempt
to exert, at least implicitly, influence over the attorney.46 The judge inquired
why a campaign sign endorsing the judge's opponent was displayed in the
yard in front of the attorney's law office and whether the display meant the
attorney was supporting the judge's opponent. The conversation was cor-
dial, but it occurred in the judge's courtroom, while the judge was on the
bench, wearing his judicial robe and immediately following a hearing in
which the attorney participated.47
B. Appointments: No Quid Pro Quo
The code of judicial conduct prohibits favoritism in appointments, re-
quiring a judge to "exercise the power of appointment impartially and on
the basis of merit."48 An appearance of favoritism "is no less to be con-
demned than is the impropriety itself."49 While few cases find proof of ac-
tual favoritism, several hold that a combination of factors produced the ap-
pearance that a judge exercised the power of appointment based on some-
thing other than the appointee's qualifications.
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (admonition pursuant to agreement for letter on judicial station-
ery to school official challenging administrative determination concerning judge's son). But
see In re Rosenblum, Order (Ill. Ct. Comm'n July 29, 1993) (dismissing a complaint alleging
that a judge used the prestige of office to advance his personal interests in connection with an
apartment building the judge co-owned by identifying himself as a judge in a telephone call to a
social worker with the charitable organization that had guaranteed the lease payments, sending
letters to the organization using official court stationery, attending several court hearings in a
criminal misdemeanor complaint against the tenant filed by the judge's co-owner, and assuming
a substantial role in the hearings).
46. In re Krouse, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order of Reprimand (Wash. State
Comm'n on Jud. Conduct June 10, 2005) at
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/casematerial/2005/4560%20stipulation.pdf. See also In re Sobel,
Imposition of Discipline (Nev. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline July 19, 2005) at
http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/decisiononsobel.htm (a judge told an attorney he was
"flicked" because he had not yet contributed to the judge's re-election campaign and asked a
second attorney why he had contributed $3,500 to the judge's opponent's campaign but only
$500 to the judge's campaign).
47. The Washington Commission also concluded that the judge appeared to personally
solicit campaign contributions in three e-mails when, during his 2004 judicial campaign, his
campaign committee co-chair sent three e-mails from the campaign e-mail accounts (pre-
fixed with "judgekrouse") that requested monetary donations to assist in the judge's cam-
paign. The e-mails were written in the first person and two of the e-mails concluded with
"Merle" (the judge's first name) in the typed signature line. The Commission noted the judge
had the duty to assure communications from his campaign committee complied with the code
of judicial conduct.
48. Canon 3C(4).
49. In re Spector, 392 N.E.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. 1979).
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For example, in a case from Alaska, 50 Judge Johnstone appointed an
individual he knew was the friend of the chief justice because the chief jus-
tice had suggested him. Because of the candidate's connection to the chief
justice, the Alaska Supreme Court noted, the judge should have known he
had to take special precautions to avoid the appearance of favoritism.5 ' In-
stead, Judge Johnstone went outside the merit selection process he had initi-
ated to appoint the chief justice's friend.5 2 The individual had not applied
during the application period, and the appointment was based on criteria
that were not part of the stated qualifications and "on terms . . . that were
significantly different from those advertised to the general public."53
The court emphasized that the question was not whether the judge's
individual actions viewed in isolation would give rise to an appearance of
impropriety" but "the cumulative effect" of the actions.5 4 The court con-
cluded that the events "would leave an objectively reasonable person with
the indelible impression" that the coroner's hiring involved favoritism.
55
The court noted that the judge's explanation that he thought the man he
hired was the most qualified applicant did not eliminate the appearance aris-
ing from the objective record. 6
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court found an appearance of im-
propriety when a judge hired his girlfriend to review and summarize medi-
cal records in nineteen cases, paying her with taxpayer funds and using tax-
payer money to pay for her training to become a certified legal nurse con-
sultant.57 No actual favoritism was found as the judge's girlfriend was fully
qualified to do the work for which she was hired and did indeed perform the
work and her involvement did not affect the judge's adjudicatory function. 8
50. In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2000). Because the case involved the chief
justice, review was by a special supreme court comprised of members of the court of appeals.
51. Id. at 1236.
52. Id. Noting that it was undisputed that the judge initially had no duty to follow a
merit selection process, the court stated that once he initiated a merit process, it should have
been obvious to the judge "that he could not select an individual from outside the process
without upsetting the reasonable expectations" of the individuals who had followed estab-
lished procedures. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1236-37.
55. Id.
56. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237. The judge was publicly reprimanded.
57. In re Granier, 906 So. 2d417 (La. 2005).
58. The judge was censured pursuant to the Judiciary Commission's recommendation,
to which the judge had consented. The judge was also required to reimburse his court for the
amount paid for his girlfriend's tuition to attend a week-long legal nurse consultant course
and to cover her travel expenses. The Commission had found that the judge "unwittingly
enriched" his girlfriend when he used taxpayer money to enable her to become a certified
legal nurse consultant, which gave her a credential she could use for additional services to
the legal community.
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The timing of a judge's appointments of her accountant as a fiduciary
was found to have created an appearance of quid pro quo in In re Lebe-
deff.59 During four years when Judge Lebedeff was appointing her personal
accountant as a fiduciary in three instances and approving more than
$21,000 in compensation, the judge was not paying the accountant for pre-
paring her taxes (a $1200 benefit) because the accountant was not billing
her.60 The Commission concluded that, even though it was not alleged that
the judge had agreed to appoint the accountant in exchange for free tax
preparation services, the judge "had a duty to avoid even the appearance of
receiving any financial benefits from her appointee.'
In In re Feinberg, the New York Court of Appeals found an appear-
ance of favoritism when a judge appointed a friend as counsel to the public
administrator and then, over more than five years in 475 proceedings,
awarded several million dollars in fees to that friend without applying statu-
tory standards and without requiring substantiation.62 After his election, the
judge, without any search or interview process, appointed his friend and law
school classmate, Louis Rosenthal, to replace the firm that had for several
decades served as counsel to the public administrator.63 Rosenthal had
59. Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Nov. 5, 2003), at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us.
60. Id. Alice Krause had been a friend of the judge since around 1978 and had prepared
the judge's tax returns since approximately 1980. Id. Once in 1993, once in 1996, and once
in 1997, the judge appointed Krause as a fiduciary or guardian of the personal needs of an
allegedly incapacitated person. Id. The judge advised the parties that Krause was her per-
sonal accountant, and there were no objections. Id. In 1997 the judge twice approved com-
pensation to Krause for her services, $16,500 in one case and $5,393 in a second. Id. Al-
though Krause had not, as of January 2003, submitted a request for payment in the third case,
she had indicated that she intended to do so. Id. From 1980 to 1996, as a general practice,
Krause prepared and contemporaneously billed the judge for her annual tax preparation
services. Id. Krause prepared the judge's 1996, 1997, and 1998 federal and state income tax
returns but did not bill the judge for those services until July 2001 after she was questioned
about her relationship with the judge by the court system's Special Inspector General for
Fiduciary Appointments. Id.
61. Id. The judge was censured pursuant to an agreement. The New York Daily News
criticized the finding of only an appearance of impropriety: "Here's how that will translate to
judges, a breed ever sensitive to precedent: The commission will not bounce a judge unless
said judge enters into a bargain with the terms written in neon. You pay me and I'll pay you
back. Short of such explicit, and criminal, corruption, the commission will frown on mutual
wallet-fattening amid winks among pals." Editorial, This Watchdog Doesn't Bark or Bite,
NEW YoRK DAILY NEWS, Nov. 26, 2003.
62. 833 N.E.2d 1204 (N.Y. 2005).
63. The public administrator administers the estates of decedents who die without a will
or where there is no qualified individual who has petitioned to administer the estate. Coun-
sel's duties include petitioning for letters of administration, marshaling the estate assets,
searching for heirs, conducting kinship hearings, disposing of real property, filing tax returns,
and generally representing the interests of the public administrator in all aspects of admini-
stration of estates. Counsel is paid from the assets of the estate and approved by the surro-
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helped to raise funds for the judge's election campaign but had limited ex-
perience in surrogate's court.
The court found that the judge had a pro forma practice of awarding
Rosenthal 8% of an estate's value, without attention to the actual work
done. The judge did not individually review the files, he never rejected or
reduced a fee request, and he never questioned a request or sought addi-
tional information. The judge never required Rosenthal to submit an affida-
vit of legal services before approving a fee request and never considered the
statutory factors for fee awards specified in the Surrogate's Court Procedure
Act. Between January 1997 and December 2002, the judge awarded Rosen-
thal $8,613,009.35 in legal fees.
The court also found that the judge's failure to follow the statute was
made more egregious by his appointment, without considering other candi-
dates, of a close personal friend and political supporter. The court stated,
"while appointment of a friend does not itself convey an appearance of im-
propriety, when, as here, that appointment is coupled with the unsubstanti-
ated award of several million dollars in fees from estates that, by definition,
lack adversarial parties to challenge the practice, the taint of favoritism is
strong.' 6
Also in New York, Judge Ray had appointed two attorneys as guardi-
ans in a disproportionate number of cases, bypassing the rotation system
through which law guardians were usually assigned by the court clerk. 65 The
judge also routinely certified payments to the attorneys without examining
gate. In re Feinberg, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Feb. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us./Determinations/F/feinberg.htm
64. In re Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d at 1209. The judge was removed from office. The court
found that the judge's "repeated explanation that he 'just read through sections' or
'skimmed' the SCPA, and that his failure-over a period of more than five years-to know
of and adhere to the single paragraph requirement of affidavits of legal services and indi-
vidualized consideration of fee requests was an 'oversight,' demonstrate a shocking disregard
for the very law that imbued him with judicial authority." Id. at 1208.
65. In re Ray, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Apr. 26, 1999), at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us. There were approximately ninety attorneys on the panel of law
guardians. Id. In 1993 the judge gave William Maney 18 % of the law guardian appointments
and gave Edward Boncek 6.4 % of the cases; in 1994 the judge gave Maney 17 % of the
appointments and Boncek 5.4 %. Id. The chief clerk and the deputy chief clerk spoke to the
judge about departing from the rotation of assignments and advised the judge that they were
receiving complaints from other attorneys that the judge was appointing certain attorneys,
particularly Maney and Boncek, to a disproportionately high number of cases. Id.
In 1993 the judge awarded Maney $58,177 and Boncek $20,253 in fees. Id. The
average fee for all law guardians assigned by the judge that year was $4,434. Id. In 1994, the
judge awarded Maney $30,660 and Boncek $13,800; the average fee that year was $3,354.
Id. Beginning in the early 1990s, the judge received quarterly statements from the law guard-
ian program that indicated that Maney and Boncek were receiving a disproportionately high
number of assignments and a disproportionately high income from their work as law guardi-
ans in the family court. Id.
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the vouchers they had submitted; had the judge reviewed the vouchers, it
would have been apparent to him that the attorneys were over-billing.66 The
appointments were particularly puzzling because one of the attorneys had
run against the judge in 1985. Then, in January 1995, after being awarded
over $88,000 in fees by the judge over two years, the attorney announced
that he would not oppose the judge for a new ten-year term.67
The New York Commission found that "the combination of these fac-
tors created the appearance that the lawyers were getting favored treatment
from the judge .... [S]uch laxity, in view of the political relationship of
respondent and [the attorney], creates the appearance that his serious lack of
oversight may have been politically motivated. 68 The judge was censured
pursuant to an agreement.
69
Because actual favoritism seems clearly proven by the agreed facts (the
disproportionate number of appointments, dodging the rotation system, rub-
ber-stamping requests for reimbursement, the political relationship), In re
Ray demonstrates an additional use of the appearance of impropriety stan-
dard-as a lesser included offense that facilitates "plea bargains" in disci-
plinary proceedings. In an agreed disposition, the appearance of impropriety
standard gives the judge a face-saving way to admit with the benefit of
hindsight to apparently committing misconduct without having to admit to
actually meaning to do anything wrong.
C. Relationships: No Harm, No Foul?
Absence of proof that a judge actually favored an attorney or party
does not preclude a finding of misconduct if a reasonable person would
assume that the judge would favor the attorney or party, however uncon-
sciously, because of a close, personal relationship. Calling "immaterial" the
question whether there was a "detrimental impact" on criminal defendants,
66. Id. An audit by the Office of Court Administration revealed that between April 1,
1992, and December 31, 1995, Maney and Boncek had submitted vouchers that grossly
overstated the number of hours that they had spent on cases and billed for proceedings that
they did not attend or for cases in which they were not assigned. Id. Some of the vouchers
double-billed for work. Id. On a number of occasions, they submitted vouchers in which they
billed for more in-court hours than the court was in session. Id.
67. Id. The other was the judge's former opponent's law partner. Id. The two attorneys
also offered to help the judge obtain the cross endorsement of the Democratic party. Id. The
judge accepted their offer. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also In re Goodman, 649 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1995) (a perception that the
court's business was based upon the exchange of favors arose when the judge entered into a
contract with a corporation to provide services for a court program where the owner of the
corporation was a close personal friend of the court administrator, hired the court administra-
tor's son-in-law, and the owner hosted an engagement party when the judge became engaged
to the corporation's in-house accountant).
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for example, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "once the public learned"
of a judge's sexual relationship with the state's attorney who appeared be-
fore him daily, "the appearance of bias was very real., 70 Thus, the court
rejected Judge Gerald's argument that his misconduct was mitigated be-
cause there was no evidence that he had favored the state. 71 Instead, the
court found persuasive the analysis of the Commission on Judicial Qualifi-
cations:
What is the public to think when they learn the assistant county attorney
was having a sexual relationship with a judge before whom she ap-
peared? . . . More importantly, what is a criminal defendant to think
when the judge sentences that defendant or overrules that defendant's
motion to suppress, when the assistant county attorney with whom he is
having a sexual relationship was arguing the case on behalf of the
State?
72
The court also held that a judge has an affirmative duty to disclose or
recuse when circumstances in his life might cause someone to reasonably
question his partiality.73 The court noted that it was not the judge's "right to
make these decisions for the affected parties. We agree with the commission
that 'this paternalistic attitude on behalf of the judge is contrary to Iowa
law. ,,74
70. In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271,278 (Iowa 2001).
71. Id. Similarly, the New York Commission concluded that a judge's impartiality was
suspect when he presided over ten cases in which mentally disabled, institutionalized patients
were represented by an attorney with whom he had a romantic relationship even though in
each case his decision was contrary to the attorney's position. In re DiBlasi, Determination
(N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Nov. 19, 2001) at http:/scjc.state.ny.us (censure for
this and other misconduct).
72. Gerard, 631 N.W.2d at 278.
73. Id. at 279.
74. Id. at 280. Several of the intimate encounters took place in rooms in the courthouse.
Id. at 277. The court acknowledged that, although both the judge and the attorney were mar-
ried to other people, it "normally would be loath to interfere in such personal matters." Id.
The court held, however, that a sexual affair is regarded as improper when it involves a sub-
ordinate in a professional, highly sensitive public context. 1d. The court suspended the judge
for sixty days without pay for this and being dilatory in filing rulings and in making reports
on unfinished rulings as required by a supreme court rule. See also In re Chrzanowski, 636
N.W.2d 758, 764 (Mich. 2001) (appearance of partiality arose despite a judge's "apparently
fair disposition" of non-adversarial cases (the prosecutor was not present) in which the attor-
ney with whom she was having an intimate relationship appeared); In re Simeone, Determi-
nation (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 6, 2004) at http:www.scjc.state.ny.us (a
judge's romantic involvement with the director of a youth services facility raised a suspicion
that his ruling was influenced by personal considerations each time he favored the position
she advocated).
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When a judge presides over a case involving a close friend, an appear-
ance of partiality arises without any evidence of actual special treatment or
even the expectation of special treatment. For example, in In re Gaddis,7
the judge had accepted Seattle Mariners baseball tickets and a dinner from
an attorney who regularly appeared before him in probate cases and de-
pended on his exercise of discretion in approving petitions for fees and
other requests.76 In addition, the judge and his wife had a personal, social
relationship with the executive director and manager of a guardianship
agency whose interests were frequently before the judge.7' The Washington
State Commission on Judicial Conduct found as follows:
While there is no evidence that either individual . . . expected or re-
ceived preferential treatment from Respondent, by accepting gifts and
favors, and privately socializing . . . with persons who appeared (and
were likely to continue to appear) before him, the judge created at a
minimum an appearance of impropriety: his conduct created a reason-
able perception of partiality and legitimate concerns about whether these
individuals were in a special position to influence the judge.78
75. Stipulation, Agreement and Order (Washington State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct
Dec. 10, 2004), at
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/case%20material/2004/3855%20Stipulation.pdf.
76. Id. On two occasions, the judge accepted four Seattle Mariners baseball tickets with
the cumulative face value of $232 without reimbursing the attorney. Id. The judge had con-
sidered the tickets to be a form of compensation for working on a manual for which the at-
torney was responsible. Id.
77. Id. At a dinner scheduled for work-related purposes, the judge also allowed the
attorney to purchase dinner for him and another person, the bill for which totaled $287.27.
Id. The judge bought a meal for this attorney on at least one occasion. Id. According to the
judge, he perceived these as professional contacts in the course of preparing continuing edu-
cation materials or ordinary social interactions. Id
78. Id. See also Inquiry Concerning Harris, Decision and Order (Cal. Comm'n on Jud.
Performance Mar. 23, 2005) at http://cjp.ca.gov.PubAdmRTF/Harris%20PA%203-23-05.rtf
(although there was no evidence of actual bias, a judge's conduct in helping an attorney who
regularly appeared before him "find dates could raise questions in the mind of an objective
observer regarding the judge's impartiality in cases handled by Mr. Schonbrun"); In re
D'Auria, 334 A.2d 332 (N.J. 1975) (although at no time did anyone expect or receive any
preferential treatment, a judge created an obvious appearance of impropriety by frequently
eating lunch in public restaurants as a guest of attorneys or representatives of insurance com-
panies in pending matters in the judge's division); In re Lebedeff, Determination (N.Y. State
Comrnm'n on Jud. Conduct Mar. 18, 2005) at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (because of her
personal and professional relationship with a plaintiff, judge's rulings in his favor raise a
suspicion that she was influenced by personal considerations; censure for this and other
misconduct); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lisotto, 761 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 2002) (ac-
cepting eight tickets to attend Pittsburgh Steelers football games from an attorney who ap-
peared in numerous cases before the judge was misconduct although there was no evidence
of any favor, preference, or improper action); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 770
N.E.2d 1007 (Ohio 2002) (receiving loans from attorneys who regularly appeared before him
was misconduct although there was no evidence that any of the attorneys received any bene-
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Moreover, an appearance that a judge is trying "to collect for past
deeds' 79 can arise from actions taken by a judge after a decision is issued. In
Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance,80 after awarding an auto-
mobile dealer $5 million in a complex civil case against a bank, while the
case was pending on appeal, the judge entered into several business transac-
tions with the dealer, for example, buying a used Mercedes for his wife and
a used 'Jeep for his daughter. 8' During his case before Judge Adams, the
automobile dealer had been represented by Patrick Frega, and in several of
the transactions, the judge relied on Frega who, without the judge's knowl-
edge, arranged for the judge to receive favorable terms.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the record did not con-
tain clear and convincing evidence that the judge had initiated the transac-
tions with "the expectation of receiving a financial favor ' 83 from the dealer.
However, the court found that, by actively soliciting the assistance of a liti-
gant to whom he had rendered an exceedingly large monetary judgment and
whose interests remained before him, the judge created an appearance of
impropriety. 84
Moreover, regardless whether he had actual knowledge of the favor-
able terms negotiated by Frega, the court stated, by placing himself in
Frega's hands, the judge "deliberately ignored the strong possibility that
Frega ultimately would arrange for the [judge] to pay less than fair market
value for the Jeep ... , The court concluded that the judge's "conduct
readily could be construed as an attempt to collect for judicial services ren-
dered in the ... litigation, and otherwise to use his judicial office to advance
his personal interests. To an objective observer, petitioner's integrity and
impartiality would appear to have been placed in doubt., 86
In addition, Judge Adams had accepted a sweater valued at $150 from
the dealer the same year as the judgment and had attended a dinner hosted
by Frega in celebration of the satisfaction of the judgment in the litigation
fit); In re Looper, 548 S.E.2d 219 (S.C. 2001) (appearance of impropriety created despite
absence of evidence that judge received favorable treatment when, while traffic charges
against a defendant were pending in his court, the judge went to a car dealership owned by
the defendant's father, and at which the defendant was employed as a salesman, and negoti-
ated with the defendant the trade-in of his automobile for a new automobile and purchased
another new vehicle from the dealership).
79. Adams v. Commn' on Jud. Performance, 897 P.2d 544, 554 (Cal. 1995).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 553-56.
82. Id. at 554-55.
83. Id. at 554.
84. Id.
85. Adams, 897 P.2d at 556.
86. Id. at 556-57.
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over which the judge had presided.87 The court found that, although the
judge did not solicit the gift, "under the circumstances it was incumbent
upon him to return it... to avoid any doubt regarding the judge's independ-
ence or any appearance of impropriety. 88 Finally, the court concluded
regardless of the judge's motives, or of whether he was biased or impar-
tial in the judicial proceedings involving the... litigation, his attendance
at the dinner given in celebration of the satisfaction of the judgment in
the... litigation indisputably gave rise to the appearance of partiality in
favor of a litigant and his attorney whose very substantial interests had
come before him.
89
D. Associating with Criminals
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that a judge's extra-marital
affair with a felon on parole from a prison sentence that the judge had im-
posed suggested "improper influence, whether or not such exists," creating
an appearance of impropriety.90 The relationship had been publicized in a
lengthy article in the Baton Rouge Advocate. The court concluded
[a]lthough it is not illegal to associate with known criminals, when a
judge, who has sworn to uphold the law, enters into an intimate relation-
ship with a convicted felon whom she sentenced in her court, the pub-
lic's perception of such a relationship causes disrespect for the judiciary
and falls below the standard the public has a right to expect.91
87. Id. at 559-61.
88. Id. at 560.
89. Id. at 557. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals found that a judge had created
the "damaging impression that his judicial decisions were influenced by personal profit mo-
tives" when he directed that nearly a quarter of a million dollars in infants' funds be depos-
ited in a credit union from which he received preferential treatment on interest, including
interest-free loans. In re Cohen, 543 N.E.2d 711 (N.Y. 1989). The court removed the judge.
See also In re Voetsch, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Aug. 17, 2005),
at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (a part-time judge created the appearance that his employment
as a real estate broker was a reward for favorable action when he accepted employment from
an individual who had recently been a successful litigant in his court and from the family of a
defendant to whom he had recently given a lenient sentence).
90. In reHarris, 713 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. 1998).
91. Id. In deciding not to remove the judge, the court emphasized that Judge Harris had
not exercised improper control over the treatment of the felon after imposition of sentence or
intervened favorably on his behalf in the parole process. Id. at 1141 n.7. See also Comm'n on
Jud. Performance v. Milling, 651 So. 2d 531, 536 (Miss. 1995) ("A justice court judge openly
living with a fugitive from another state charged with several drug related felonies without a
doubt creates an 'appearance of impropriety."'); In re Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 1998)
(removal for, in addition to other misconduct, having close contacts with people the judge
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In New Jersey, Judge Blackman attended a picnic two days before his
host, a friend of the judge for eighteen years, was going to begin a
two-and-one-half year prison sentence for racketeering. 92 The picnic was
widely publicized and attended by 150 to 200 people. Newspaper accounts
interpreted the judge's attendance as support for the felon, a former local
official, and characterized the event as a going-away party.93
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the judge's attendance
at the picnic "could be perceived as evidencing sympathy for the convicted
individual or disagreement with the criminal justice system that brought
about the conviction," noting "such conduct may raise questions concerning
the judge's allegiance to the judicial system" and "generate legitimate con-
cern about the judge's attitude toward judicial responsibilities, weakening
confidence in the judge and the judiciary., 94 Acknowledging that the judge
did not act with an improper motive, the court stated the judge's "presence
at the party was the subject of public scrutiny, not his feelings of friend-
ship."95
As a judge, respondent had a duty to foresee that his actions might be
open to criticism by the press or members of the public. Even if such
criticism might be a misinterpretation of his motives, respondent none-
theless had an obligation to avoid any conduct that might lead to such
criticism. By putting his personal feelings ahead of his responsibility as
a judge and attending the party, respondent conducted himself improp-
erly and exhibited insensitivity and poor judgment. He conveyed the
wrong image of the judiciary. 96
The "going away" party was in 1990, six months after the court had
publicly reprimanded two judges for attending the Governor's Inaugural
Ball with their spouses, two years after the New Jersey Advisory Committee
on Extra-Judicial Activities had issued an opinion warning judges not to
attend a dinner to honor a prosecutor on his or her reappointment, and fif-
teen years after a judge had been sanctioned for frequently being a luncheon
guest of attorneys in pending matters. In light of those authorities the court
stated, Judge Blackman should have known that "a judge who attends a
public or social event will be perceived as endorsing or supporting not only
the event itself but also persons associated with the event.,
97
had placed on probation).
92. In re Blackman, 591 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
93. Id. at 1342.
94. Id. at 1341-42.
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E. Statements: "Just Kidding"
The appearance of impropriety standard has been used to foil a judge's
attempt to negate the obvious import of a statement that casts doubt on the
basis on which the judge reached a decision.
In In re Best,98 for example, the judge, in a case in which a defendant
charged with battery was representing himself, asked the courtroom audi-
ence, "If you think I ought to find him not guilty, will you stand up?
99
Then, he asked, "If you think I ought to find him guilty, stand up."'100 The
judge then found the defendant guilty.10 1
Conceding that he should not have asked the audience to vote, the
judge argued that his conduct was not sanctionable because his guilty ver-
dict was based on the evidence presented at trial and he had only wanted to
"involve the public in the judicial process."' 0 2 In fact, no one in the audi-
ence had stood up after either request by the judge. 10 3 Rejecting the judge's
argument, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated
[w]hether or not Judge Best actually based his verdict on the audience's
vote does not determine whether or not his conduct is sanctionable. The
mere fact that he asked the courtroom audience to vote on the guilt of
the defendant gave the impression that Judge Best based his verdict on
something other than the evidence presented at trial. This type of behav-
ior destroys the credibility of the judiciary and undermines public confi-
dence in the judicial process. 04
In re Schif 0 5 also involved statements by a judge that suggested he
was making a decision based on something other than the facts or the law. A
part-time judge who also practiced law had dismissed traffic charges filed
against the driver of a car who had been in an auto accident with Judge
Schiff.10 6 After learning of the dismissal, Judge Schiff remarked to the ar-
resting officer, "It's a wheel. It goes around and maybe someday I can do
the same for him."'1 7 Judge Schiff also told an attorney he was so angry at
the part-time judge that he intended to grant the plaintiff's motion for judg-
98. 719 So. 2d 432 (La. 1998).
99. Id. at 434.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 435.
103. Id.
104. Best, 719 So. 2d at 435-36; see also In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301 (La.1976) (cen-
sure for giving the appearance of deciding the guilt or innocence of several defendants by
flipping a coin).




ment in a case in which the defendant was represented by the part-time
judge's law firm.108 The judge did grant judgment for the plaintiff but ar-
gued in discipline proceedings that he had done so on the merits.' 09 The
New York Court of Appeals concluded that argument was "largely irrele-
vant to the charge ... ,110 The court stated that
the harm inured when he indicated he would use his judicial powers to
satisfy a personal vendetta, a classic instance in which "an appearance of
such impropriety is no less to be condemned than is the impropriety it-
self." Petitioner created the impression that he was using his judicial of-
fice to retaliate, and thus failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety
and to conduct himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.Il
Similarly, in In re Cunningham,12 the New York Court of Appeals
censured a county court judge who had told a city court judge in a letter that
he would never change a sentence the city court judge had imposed, stating:
"You can do whatever you want to whenever you want to & I'll agree with
you... I take the position that you know the case and as sentencing judge




Emphasizing that a judge must view matters on their merits alone
without regard to public or professional disapproval, the court stated that a
judge must also avoid creating the appearance that he or she "would decide
a matter before him in any other manner."' 14 Noting the record did not indi-
cate that Judge Cunningham "actually abrogated his appellate duty to re-
view matters before him on the basis of their merits alone," the court con-
cluded that, regardless whether Judge Cunningham was influenced by his
concern about the other judge's criticism, his letter constituted judicial mis-
conduct because he created "the appearance that he might be prejudging
certain matters."'"15
108. Id. at 288.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Schiff, 635 N.E.2d. at 288 (quoting In re Spector, 392 N.E.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. 1979)).
The judge was removed for this and other misconduct.
112. 442 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1982).
113. Id. at 435. When Judge Cunningham learned that the city court judge was upset that
he had signed an order to show cause in a case, he wrote a second letter stating that "if I
catch the appeal, I will affirm, as always, on a judge's discretion." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 436. Judge Cunningham had in fact overturned one of the city judge's sen-
tences on appeal. Id. Judge Cunningham was censured. See also In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d
120, 122-23 (N.Y. 2000) (a judge's statement that Utica was a "fucking black hole" and he
wanted to get back to Syracuse because it was "men's night out" created the appearance that
he was pressuring the prosecutor to agree to a plea bargain even if it was, as he claimed,
"banter;" the judge was removed for this and other misconduct).
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After sentencing in a drunk-driving case, a California judge evaluated
the deputy district attorney's performance, telling her she had done well but
needed to be prepared to adjust her strategy after an unanticipated ruling.1 16
Referring to his exclusion of the defendant's pre-field sobriety statements,
the judge stated that he knew that the statements were admissible but kept
them out to see how the young prosecutor would handle herself. 17 The
California Commission on Judicial Performance found that the judge's
statement gave the appearance that he had decided a legal issue to teach a
lesson to a new lawyer, noting that the judge failed to appreciate how his
choice of words implicitly suggested that his ruling was questionable if not
wrong. 118
Finally, based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington Com-
mission reprimanded a judge for writing "NTG" on hundreds of defendants'
judgment and sentence forms, generally understood to be an acronym for
"Nail This Guy."" 9 The judge maintained that "NTG" meant "Note This
Guy (or Gal)," and that he used the initials as a private method to remind
him of which cases he believed deserved closer scrutiny should he be re-
quired to review that person's sentence following a reported violation of
sentencing condition.
The judge acknowledged, however, that it was widely rumored among
court employees and attorneys who practiced in his court that the initials
meant "Nail This Guy" and that he contributed to that rumor by making
statements to others that would cause them to believe that was what the let-
ters stood. Although the objective evidence did not establish actual bias or
prejudice or that the judge prejudged a particular case, the judge acknowl-
edged that some parties, counsel, and staff could have understood that he
had prejudged cases and intended to treat some defendants harshly, cruelly,
or inappropriately in the future. The agreement stated
[t]he Code of Judicial Conduct deals not only with subjective intent, but also
with appearances. Whatever Respondent may have intended "NTG" to mean,
his words and conduct led others to believe "NTG" meant "Nail This Guy." By
writing "NTG" on some defendants' judgment and sentence forms, generally
understood to be an acronym for "Nail This Guy," Respondent created the ap-
116. Inquiry Concerning VonVoorhis, Decision and Order (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Per-
formance Feb. 27, 2003) at http:cjp.ca.gov/CN%20removals/VanVoorhis%202-27-03.rtf.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Commission removed the judge for this and ten additional instances of im-
proper courtroom demeanor. Id. See also In re Smith, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n
on Jud. Conduct June 26, 1998) at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/s/smith,m.htm
(a judge created the appearance of bias against the prosecution by engaging in ill-placed
humor, minimizing charges before her, and making remarks concerning the reliability of
prosecution witnesses.)
119. In re Bums, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order of Reprimand (Wash. State Comm'n
on Jud. Conduct June 8, 2004) at www.cjc.state.wa.us.
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pearance he was biased or prejudiced against those individuals he intended to
"nail." Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary is un-
dermined when a judge's conduct creates the perception that a case has been pre-
judged or that there is a bias against a party, regardless of whether the perceived
bias or prejudice exists. Persons who believed Respondent wrote "Nail This
Guy" in code on some defendants' judgments could reasonably conclude that
those defendants received, or would receive, disparate or unfair treatment from
the court.
F. Manifestations of Bias
An Illinois judge, during one of several intemperate exchanges, said
"when I'm talking to you boy, you look at me," to an adult African-
American defendant in a criminal case.12 0 The judge admitted that this was
discourteous but denied that it was a manifestation of bias, arguing he did
not say "boy" with any racial intent or to demean the defendant. 12' The
judge presented over one hundred letters from people who knew him in his
professional capacity stating they had never heard him make a racially bi-
ased remark. 
122
The Illinois Courts Commission acknowledged that the term "boy" di-
rected at an African American was offensive but found that "the term itself
is not objectively racist and thus does not necessarily indicate racial bias or
prejudice." 123 Therefore, it concluded that the Judicial Inquiry Board had
not proved that the judge had manifested bias or prejudice in the exercise of
his judicial duties.124
In contrast, in In re Ellender, 125 the Louisiana Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a white judge's appearance in black face at a party created an
appearance of bias even absent evidence the judge was prejudiced in his
decision-making. Judge Ellender had attended a Halloween party at a res-
taurant dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit and handcuffs, black face, and
a black afro wig. 126 Most of the people at the restaurant were party guests,
but there were five or six additional diners; the restaurant remained open for
take out, and the staff of the restaurant, including an African-American em-




124. Id. The Commission removed the judge from office for this instance and two addi-
tional instances of intemperate conduct and using his parents' address to run for office when
his permanent abode was outside the sub-circuit in which he was running. Id.
125. 889 So. 2d 225 (La. 2004).
126. Id. at 227. The choice of costumes was intended to be humorous by implying that
the judge's new wife, who reportedly was young and attractive and was dressed as a police
officer, had her husband under her control. Id.
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ployee, was also present. 2 7 Apparently, one of the witnesses reported the
incident to the local newspaper, and on November 9, there was an article
entitled "Local judge's masquerade sparks racial concerns. 128 Local broad-
cast media picked up the story, followed by CNN and two New Orleans
television stations. 29 The local office of the NAACP received calls com-
plaining about the judge's Halloween masquerading. 30 The Judiciary
Commission received six complaints, including complaints filed by the
NAACP, the judge's colleagues on the bench, and one of the justices of the
Louisiana Supreme Court.' 31
The judge admitted the factual allegations and agreed that he had vio-
lated Canons 1 and 2A, which require a judge to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary and require that a judge shall respect and
comply with the law, but did not agree that that his conduct was demeaning
towards African-Americans. The district attorney's office reviewed the
judge's docket but did not find any disparity in the judge's sentencing based
on race.132 Four African-Americans testified before the Commission that
Judge Ellender is a good judge whom they consider fair and impartial.133
The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's finding
that the judge's conduct "called into question his ability to be fair and im-
partial towards African-Americans who appear before his court as defen-
dants in criminal proceedings, as well as towards any African-American
litigant or attorney in any proceeding before him, thereby creating the ap-
pearance of impropriety.' 34 Although agreeing that the judge did not intend
to offer an affront to the African-American community, the court concluded
that "his behavior exhibits his failure to appreciate the effects of his actions





131. Ellender, 889 So. 2d at 228.
132. Id. at 232.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 229.
135. Id. at 233. The court suspended the judge without pay for one year but deferred six
months of the suspension on the condition that the judge enroll in a course at one of the local
universities that will allow him "to gain insight into the attitude of other racial groups, par-
ticularly racial groups where interrelations are marked by antagonism, discrimination and
conflict." Id See also In re Sardino, 448 N.E.2d 83 (N.Y. 1983) (referring to defendants as
"creatures," calling one defendant a "maniac," and similar statements at arraignment "could
only create the impression in the mind of the public that [the judge] was predisposed against
those defendants who appeared before him if not defendants generally" even if he did not
actually harbor any bias); In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 198 (Or. 1994) (off-bench statements
about a prosecutor such as "she has placed herself in a position for which she has neither the
training or experience to perform the duties competently" created the impression that the
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IV. THE TEST
The commentary to Canon 2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct states that "the test for appearance of impropriety is whether the con-
duct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability
to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and compe-
tence is impaired. 1 36 Similar iterations are "whether a person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act
with integrity, impartiality, and competence," 137 whether a reasonable per-
son.would question the impartiality of the court,138 and whether the conduct
would "have a negative effect on the confidence of the thinking public in
the administration of justice."' 39 A finding of an appearance of impropriety
is often based on a combination of factors and the cumulative effect of the
circumstances. 
4 0
In a literal approach to the appearance of impropriety standard, judicial
discipline cases often start with the improprieties defined in the code 14 ' and
then proceed if an actual violation is not proven to consider whether an ap-
pearance of a violation was created. In other words, if "notwithstanding the
absence of proof of any actual or intended impropriety," whether the
judge's conduct "inescapably created a circumstantial appearance of impro-
priety. 142 Similar pronouncements of the rule provide that an appearance of
impropriety is established if a reasonable person would be justified in sus-
pecting that the judge violated the code, 143 in having an "undispelled suspi-
judge would be biased in favor of the state in order to make up for the alleged incompetence
of the district attorney). But see In re Nakoski, 742 A.2d 260 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Dis. 1999) (finding
a judge did not commit misconduct when, in response to the question "It's not unlawful or
illegal to be a black man, is it?" asked in a continuing education program, the judge said
"Yes" and "They're all in jail. They're the ones doing all the robberies and burglaries").
136. Canon 2A (1990). See, e.g., In re O'Bier, 833 A.2d 950, 957 (Del. Ct. Jud. 2003)
(by displaying a weapon in a way that made two court clerks feel their safety was threatened
and persistently carrying his weapon while at work in a way that the weapon was clearly
visible to the public and employees, a judge created "the perception that his ability to carry
out his judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence was impaired").
137. Cal. Code of Jud. Ethics, Canon 2A. cmt.
138. In re Snow, 674 A.2d 573, 577 (N.H. 1996).
139. In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669, 683 (Mass. 1978).
140. See, e.g., supra discussion of In re Ray at text accompanying notes 65-69 and In re
Johnstone at text accompanying notes 50-56.
141. Commentary to Canon 2A provides that "actual improprieties under this standard
include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code."
142. In re Spector, 392 N.E.2d 552, 555 (N.Y.1979).
143. In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 263 (La. 1989).
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cion" of actual impropriety, 44 or in believing that "an impropriety is
afoot."'
145
For example, an actual impropriety in Kennick v. Commission on Judi-
cial Performance1 46 would have been proven if one of the attorneys with
whom the judge met alone in chambers admitted that they had had ex parte
communications about the case in which they were appearing that day on
the judge's calendar. Even absent that direct evidence of ex parte communi-
cations, however, the California Supreme Court found that the judge's prac-
tice of having social visits with two favored attorneys on days when they
were appearing in his court gave rise to an appearance of impropriety, in
other words, an appearance of ex parte communications.1
47
A crucial element of the appearance of impropriety standard as inter-
preted by the judicial discipline authorities is the consideration of whether
the conduct was readily avoidable, 48 in other words, whether there were
reasonable precautions the judge could have taken to avoid creating the ap-
pearance of impropriety. 149 For example, in In re Bonin,150 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that the chief justice of a superior court
had created an appearance of impropriety by failing to make inquiries about
a meeting he was planning to attend at which Gore Vidal would be speaking
on "Sex and Politics in Massachusetts."'15 1 If the judge had made those in-
144. In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1237 (Alaska 2000).
145. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 723 (Alaska 1990). The most ex-
pansive definition of the standard explains:
Because conduct that necessitates a full-scale inquiry to allay public suspicion it-
self suggests impropriety, an impermissible appearance also might be found-
regardless of whether an investigation eventually dispelled suspicion of actual
misconduct-if readily avoidable conduct foreseeably caused reasonably intelli-
gent and informed members of the public to demand a full inquiry into suspected
impropriety.
In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1237 n.38 (Alaska 2000).
146. 787 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1990).
147. Id. at 609-10. See also In re Slusher, Stipulation, Agreement, Order of Admonish-
ment (Wash. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct Apr. 1, 1994), at
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/case%20material/1994/1518%20stipulation.pdf (finding a viola-
tion of code ofjudicial conduct where a judge engaged in a casual and cordial conversation
in the courtroom with one of the parties in a case that the other party observed, while the
attorneys for both parties were discussing settlement outside the courtroom even though there
was no evidence that the judge discussed the proceeding); In re Huttner, Determination (N.Y.
State Comm'n on Jud. Conduct July 5, 2005) at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us (even if a judge
and attorney did not discuss the merits of the case the attorney was handling before the judge
during their out-of-court meetings, the appearance of impropriety was inevitable, com-
pounded by the judge's eleven fiduciary appointments to the attorney).
148. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237 n.38.
149. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d at 723.
150. 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978).
151. Id. at 685.
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quiries, he would have learned that the meeting was a fund-raiser to benefit
defendants in criminal cases, alleging sex acts between men and boys, in the
court in which he was chief justice although the cases were not assigned to
him.'
52
The court noted that it would be an impropriety for a judge to attend a
meeting knowing that the proceeds "were to be used as a defense fund or
knowing that pending cases would be the subject of partisan comment."'' 53
Therefore, the court concluded, "it was likewise an impropriety, although a
lesser one, for the Chief Justice, in his impatience or rashness, to fail to take
heed of information and warnings which would have brought more definite
knowledge to him if he had considered or pursued them seriously.' 54 Simi-
larly, an appearance of impropriety could have easily been avoided if Judge
Ellender had gone to the Halloween party in a Spiderman costume, 55 if
Judge Adams had returned the sweater from the car dealer, 156 if Judge
Feinberg had read and followed (not just "skimmed") the Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act, 57 or if Judge Mosley had used personal stationery in his
letter to his son's school.
158
The model code does not describe the reasonable person who is the
subject of the appearance of impropriety test. Cases have described the rea-
sonable person as "a reasonably intelligent and informed member of the
public,' 59 "an objective observer," 160 and "the average person encountered
in society.'' Other formulations emphasize what a reasonable person is
not: not the judge himself or herself,162 not a well-trained lawyer, 163 not a
highly sophisticated observer of public affairs, 64 and not a cynic skeptical
of the government and the courts. 65 Perhaps the most evocative variation
152. Id. A newspaper had carried a picture of the chief justice at the meeting on the front
page with a headline, "Bonin at benefit for sex defendants." Id. at 680. The newspaper had a
story and, on page three, a picture of the chief justice with Gore Vidal. Id. At the meeting,
there was also discussion of the pending cases, the harassment of gay people by the district
attorney and the police, and the current "witchhunt" and "show trials." Id. at 679.
153. Id. at 682.
154. Id. The judge was censured for this and other misconduct. Id. at 685.
155. See supra discussion of In re Ellender at text accompanying notes 125-35.
156. See supra discussion of Adams v. Comm 'n on Jud. Performance at text accompany-
ing notes 80-90.
157. See supra discussion of In re Feinberg at text accompanying notes 62-64.
158. See supra discussion of In re Mosley at text accompanying notes 42-43.
159. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237 n.38.
160. Adams, 897 P.2d at 548.
161. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d at 1340.
162. Snow, 674 A.2d at 577 (quoting Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390
(N.H. 1992)).




2005] AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 91
characterizes the reasonable person as "neither excessively indulgent, nor
excessively jaundiced." 166
Further, the reasonable person would not be "uninformed or misin-
formed,"'167 and the perception of an impropriety must be based on more
than vague conjectures and subtle innuendo. 168 Realistically, however, a
reasonable person could not know "every conceivably relevant fact' 69 but
would know "all available information,"' 170 "all the relevant circumstances
that a reasonable inquiry would disclose,"' 7' or the "totality of circum-
stances." 172
One factor the reasonable person could not be presumed to know is the
judge's subjective motive or state of mind.173 Thus, "whatever [the judge's]
motive, it is no cure for conduct that creates an appearance of impropri-
ety."'174 A judge's explanation for his or her conduct "may shed light on his
after-the-fact, subjective belief," but it does nothing to eliminate the appear-
ance arising from the objective record. 175 For example, a reasonable person
could not know whether Judge Golniewicz was actually unbiased when he
called an African-American defendant "boy,"' 176 whether Judge Gerard was
actually able to overlook his sexual relationship with the prosecutor when
he ruled in her cases, 177 or whether Judge Johnstone actually would have
thought the person he chose was the best person for the coroner position
even if the chief justice had not suggested the candidate. 78
Similarly, a reasonable person would not know the subjective state of
mind of other persons implicated in the judge's conduct. For example, a
reasonable person could not know whether the charges against Judge Pen-
nington's son would have been dismissed even if the judge had not met with
166. In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 584 (Pa. 1992).
167. Id. at 582.
168. Id. at 584.
169. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d at 1340. But see CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHics,
Cannon 2A cmt. ("The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of
the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with integrity,
impartiality, and competence").
170. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237 n.38.
171. DEL. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 2A cmt. ("The test for appearance of impropri-
ety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the rele-
vant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and compe-
tence is impaired.")
172. Larsen, 616 A.2d at 584.
173. Blackman, 591 A.2d at 1341.
174. Snow, 674 A.2d at 578.
175. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237.
176. See supra discussion of In re Golniewicz at text accompanying notes 120-24.
177. See supra discussion of In re Gerald at text accompanying notes 70-74.
178. See supra discussion of In re Johnstone at text accompanying notes 50-56.
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the prosecutor 79 or whether the car dealer would have given the same deals
he gave to Judge Adams to someone who had not just entered a multi-
million dollar judgment in his favor.1 8°
Moreover, if a judge's conduct is not public, suspicions are more rea-
sonable and an appearance of impropriety more likely because what actually
happened cannot be known by the reasonable person and the absence of
misconduct would have to be taken on faith. For example, because the con-
versations took place in private, whether Judge Kennick was actually dis-
cussing cases with the attorneys in his chambers 81 or whether Judge Chais-
son really pressed for a favorable settlement' 82 is inherently unknowable by
the reasonable person and, therefore, irrelevant to the question whether
there was an appearance of impropriety.
V. CRITICISM OF THE STANDARD
A. Chilling effect
The argument that the appearance of impropriety standard "chills cou-
rageous and innovative judicial decision-making"'' 83 is contradicted by the
case-law. The cases in which a judge has been disciplined for a legal error
or abuse of discretion (which are exceptions to the usual rule that mere legal
error does not constitute misconduct 184) do not rely on the Canon 2 appear-
ance language. Instead, those cases are based on the Section 2A requirement
that a judge "respect and comply with the law," the Section 3B(2) injunction
"to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it," or the
Section 3B(7) obligation to "accord to every person who has a legal interest
in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to
law." Moreover, as the previous discussion of the case-law demonstrates,
none of the cases applying the appearance of impropriety standard are based
on the substance of a judge's decision but on surrounding conduct that
makes it harder to accept the integrity of that decision.
Furthermore, the element of the test that permits a finding only when
the judge did not use reasonable care to prevent an appearance of impropri-
ety ensures that the standard cannot be applied to sanction a judge for the
substance of a decision. In cases in which a judge is "duty-bound to take
actions or make rulings that will predictably stir public controversy,
179. See supra discussion ofln re Pennington at text accompanying notes 30-32.
180. See supra discussion of In re Adams at text accompanying notes 79-89.
181. See supra discussion of In re Kennick at text accompanying notes 146-47.
182. See supra discussion of In re Chaisson at text accompanying notes 33-39.
183. APRL comments, supra note 13.
184. See Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balanc-
ing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1245 (2004).
[Vol. 28
2005] AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 93
duty certainly must prevail over appearance: when duty requires a judge to
take controversial action, it would be logically untenable and morally re-
pugnant to suggest that the judge should be sanctioned merely because the
action raises a public clamor."'
' 85
B. Vagueness
The primary attack on the appearance of impropriety standard is that
the language is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.186 Reservations
about the standard expressed before the standard was first adopted in 1972,
however, are not persuasive because subsequent experience has disproved
their premise. 87 In light of the tests, limits, and definitions applied by the
commissions and courts in the discipline cases in the past thirty years, the
"appearance of impropriety" language would survive a vagueness challenge.
A "statute or rule is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it
does not specifically designate the various different means by which it is
violated."'188 Rules setting guidelines for members of a profession such as
lawyers and judges "need not meet the precise standards of clarity that
might be required of rules of conduct for laymen."' 89 Application of a
vagueness analysis depends on the context, and judges, like lawyers, are
185. Johnstone, 2 P.3d at 1237.
186. APRL argues that the standard places "judges at risk of disciplinary action depend-
ing upon the whim of judicial disciplinary authorities." APRL comments, supra at note 13.
That accusation is grossly unfair to judicial disciplinary authorities, the commissions com-
prised of experienced attorneys, respected lay community leaders, and judges who are nor-
mally accused of being too soft on judges, not capriciously hard. Further, the final authority
in state judicial discipline cases (in all but a few states) is the state supreme court, not an
arbitrary body subject to fads and quirks. The risk to judges posed by the appearance of
impropriety standard is apparently slight as APRL does not cite any cases it considers to be
an unfair application of the standard although judges have allegedly been subject to the
"whim" of judicial disciplinary authorities since at least 1972. In fact, of the over 30,000
states court judges in the United States, in 2004, for example, only eighteen judges (or for-
mer judges) were removed from office (ten additional judges resigned in lieu of discipline
pursuant to agreements with judicial commissions that were made public) and only eighty-six
additional judges (or former judges) were publicly sanctioned. Most of those cases did not
involve findings of an appearance of impropriety but of an actual violation of the different
sections of the code. While those statistics do not prove the commissions are ineffective,
neither do they give any support for the argument that the commissions and courts are en-
forcing the appearance of impropriety standard (or indeed any provision of the code) in a
capricious or draconian fashion.
187. APRL cites the 1969 comments of former United States Supreme Court Justice
Arthur Goldberg that Canon 2 is "unbelievably ambiguous." Nonjudicial Activities of Su-
preme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings on S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Congress
(1969).
188. In re McGuire, 685 N.W.2d 748, 762 (N.D. 2004).
189. In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C. 1977).
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professionals who have the benefit of guidance provided by case law, court
rules, the "lore of the profession,"'190 "the traditions of the judicial profes-
sion," and "its established practices."'
' 91
"[N]ecessarily broad standards of professional conduct" are constitu-
tionally permissible if they reflect the fundamental principle of professional
responsibility. 92 Under this analysis, the rule defining attorney misconduct
to include "conduct prejudicial to the administrative ofjustice"193 -a phrase
no more precise than "the appearance of impropriety"-has been to held to
meet due process requirements. 
194
Moreover, the necessarily general provisions of the code of judicial
conduct' 95 have withstood vagueness challenges. In In re Hill,196 for exam-
ple, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the judge's argument that Section
2A and Section 2B did not give adequate notice of proscribed conduct and
did not protect against arbitrary enforcement. (Section 2A provides: "A
judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary." Section 2B provides: "A judge shall not lend the prestige of
judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor
shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.")
The court noted that the "test for determining whether the Canons are
vague is whether they convey to a judge a sufficiently definite warning of
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and prac-
tice.' 197 The court stated that "neither absolute certainty nor impossible
standards of specificity are required," especially in judicial discipline, where
the purpose is "not to punish criminal conduct, but rather to maintain stan-
dards of judicial fitness."' 98 The court also concluded that a judge was pro-
tected against arbitrary enforcement because violations of the canons were
190. Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Sny-
der, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (U.S. 1985)).
191. Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d
325, 328 (W.V. 1988).
192. In re Charges Against NP, 361 N.W.2d 386, 395 (Minn. 1985) (quoting In re Gil-
lard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 809 n.7 (Minn. 1978)).
193. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 8.4(d) (2003).
194. NP, 361 N.W.2d at 395; Keiler, 380 A.2d at 126 (D.C. 1977); Douglas, 370 S.E.2d
at 328 (W.V. 1988); Howell, 843 F.2d at 208 (5th. Cir. 1988); In re Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d
507, 512 (Minn. 1997).
195. Commentary to Canon 2 explains that "because it is not practicable to list all prohib-
ited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges
that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code."
196. In re Hill, 8 S.W. 3d 578 (Mo. 2000).
197. Id. at 582.
198. Id.
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only evidence of misconduct and, ultimately, the court had to find that the
judge violated the constitutional standard of misconduct before discipline
could be imposed. 199
Similarly, in In re Complaint Against Harper,20 0 the Ohio Supreme
Court held that Section 2A and Section 7B(1)(a) "provided reasonable op-
portunity for regulated persons to know what conduct was prohibited, and
were also explicit enough to prevent arbitrary enforcement, they are not
subject to attack under the vagueness doctrine., 20 1 (Section 7B(1)(a) states,
"An incumbent judge, or a candidate for judicial office should maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office.") The court reasoned, "like the mili-
tary, fire and police departments, and civil service, the judiciary is a special-
ized community governed by a specific discipline and body of rules. 2 °2 The
court also noted that "sanctions like public reprimands, that [sic] are applied
for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, are more civil or administra-
tive than criminal., 20 3 Finally, the court stated that "fair warning of the pro-
hibited conduct existed" in an advisory opinion, pre-existing case law, cus-
tom, and usage.2 4
199. Id. at 583. See also McGuire, 685 N.W.2d at 762 (rejecting arguments that Canons
IA, 2 and 3B(4) are unconstitutionally vague); In re Ritchie, 870 P.2d 967, 973 (Wash. 1994)
(court's careful reading of Canons 1 and 2 led to rejection of judge's argument that he did
not know that mischaracterizing activities for which he sought reimburse was improper).
A federal district court did hold that the appearance of impropriety provision in
Canon 2 as well as the general provisions in Canon 1 were unconstitutional, but that decision
was vacated on appeal on abstention grounds. Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on Jud
Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D. N.Y. 2003), vacated, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if
the decision had not been vacated, the district court's analysis would be irrelevant; because
the conduct at issue involved political activities, the district court applied a much stricter
constitutional analysis than would ordinarily apply to a constitutional challenge to Canon 2.
Moreover, the district judge's holding was premised on his belief that only "murder and
mayhem, or bribery" "plainly denigrate the integrity and independence of the judiciary," an
unsupportable assertion that indicates his decision that the canons violated due process was
as ungrounded as his overturned decision that abstention was not required.
200. 673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996).
201. Id. at 1264.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24 (W.V. 1994), the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the state's interests were sufficiently served by the specific prohibitions on
judges' speech in the code and that the general prohibitions in Canons 1, 2, and 3 may not be
used to punish judges for public remarks that do not violate either a specific prohibition or
some other law. Id However, the court stated, "This is not to say that Canons 1 and 2 are
facially unconstitutional .... Id. at 33.
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C. Difficulty
A review of the cases discussed above suggests that the problem is not
that judges believed that a reasonable person would not think their conduct
improper, but that they did not even try beforehand to consider a perspective
other than their own. However, it has been argued that judges could not
know what would violate the appearance of impropriety provision because
it requires they, who do not stand outside the system, "imagine how a rea-
sonable, well-informed observer of the judicial system would react., 20 5 As
"a dispenser rather than a recipient or observer of decisions," this argument
maintains, "the judge understands how professional standards and the desire
to preserve one's reputation often enforce the obligation to administer jus-
tice impartially, even when an observer might be suspicious. ''2°6 A related
argument is that the standard imposes an unfair stress on judges that "tends
to undermine their own sense of worth.,
207
That argument suggests that judges have been elevated to such a lofty
position that they can no longer conceive of the opinion of the reasonable
non-judge, reflecting an arrogance that most judges do not share and that
corrodes public confidence in the judiciary. The appearance of impropriety
standard provides a needed antidote to that arrogance by requiring judges to
develop a habit of thought that considers an objective view. The reasonable
person standard is familiar to judges from a variety of contexts, and while it
may be difficult for them to imagine what a reasonable person might think,
they should know that they at least have to try as a necessary corrective to
the subjectivity of their own evaluation of their own conduct.
Further, judges are not without guidance in determining what creates
an appearance of impropriety. Judges can and should turn to their col-
leagues, family, and friends for advice like most people do. Moreover,
judges can refer to existing case-law and advisory opinions for guidance
about what the reasonable person might think. Given the numerous cases on
the topic, for example, no judge could claim surprise that gratuitously refer-
ring to the judicial office or using judicial stationery in private business
creates an appearance of impropriety.
Moreover, there are judicial ethics advisory committees in most states
and for federal judges that will advise a judge, either informally or in writ-
ing, whether the judge's contemplated conduct is an impropriety or creates
an appearance of impropriety. These opinions do not necessarily bind the
205. APRL comments, supra at note 13, quoting In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th
Cir. 1990). APRL neglects to quote the remainder of the analysis in which the court appears
to credit judges' ability "to hold in mind that these outside observers are less inclined to
credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself will be." Id.
206. Id.
207. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 558 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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judicial discipline authorities, but asking provides a judge with the perspec-
tive of the objective, reasonable persons who make up the committee and
compliance with an opinion provides a good faith defense in disciplinary
proceedings. When judicial stationery may appropriately be used, what gifts
may be accepted, what functions are not appropriate to attend, whether to
preside in a case involving an individual with whom a judge has a relation-
ship, and whether to appoint a particular person are precisely the types of
questions advisory committees frequently address.2 °8
D. Comparisons to Standards for Lawyers
In 1969 the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility used
"avoid the appearance of impropriety" as the title of a rule prohibiting a
former government lawyer from accepting certain private employment and
from stating or implying "that he is able to influence improperly or upon
irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.- 20 9 In
addition, "avoid the appearance of impropriety" was one of the canons or
"axiomatic norms" from which disciplinary rules were derived 210 and was
included in several "ethical considerations" or aspirational principles.
21
'
Accepting arguments that a more specific rule was needed, the ABA elimi-
nated the appearance of impropriety standard when it replaced the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1983 with the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.2 12
Thus, one of the arguments used to support deleting the appearance of
impropriety standard from the model code of judicial conduct is to bring the
rules for judges in line with the rules for lawyers.21 3 The easy and decisive
answer to that argument is that judges should be held to higher ethical stan-
dards than lawyers. While lawyers may have a hard time balancing the be-
208. See http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth-advis_commlinks.asp.
209. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 9-101 (1969).
210. Model Code of Prof'I Responsibility Canon 9 (1969). In the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with
the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general
concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived." Id.
at Preliminary Statement.
211. Model Code of Prof'1 Responsibility EC 9-3, EC 9-6. In the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, ethical considerations "are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations."
Id. at Preliminary Statement.
212. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation: Should the Ap-
pearance of Impropriety Rules be Eliminated in New Jersey-Or Revised Everywhere Else?
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 315 (1977).
213. See APRL comments, supra note 13.
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liefs of a reasonable person about impropriety with their obligation to be an
advocate for a client, judges do not have that conflict because acting with an
integrity that promotes public confidence in judicial decisions is their pri-
mary ethical responsibility. Moreover, it is a judge's job to apply general
laws to specific facts, and it is not unfair to ask judges to aspire to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and to sanction judges who fail to do so.
In addition, the reasons for deleting the standard from the Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility do not apply to the code of judicial conduct. Com-
ment 5 to the pre-Ethics 2000 version of Rule 1.9 explained that the appear-
ance of impropriety standard was deleted because, under the standard, "dis-
qualification would become little more than a question of subjective judg-
ment by the former client.', 214 However, the standard in the code of judicial
conduct is the reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard. Com-
ment 5 also argued that because "'impropriety' is undefined, the term 'ap-
pearance of impropriety' is question-begging., 215 In contrast, the code of
judicial conduct does define impropriety; commentary to Canon 2 states that
"[a]ctual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court
rules or other specific provisions of this Code. 21 6
Finally, attempts to downgrade the appearance of impropriety language
in the code of judicial conduct to only an insignificant, unenforceable title
are unconvincing.217 Canon 2 is a complete, declaratory sentence in contrast
to the sentence fragments that comprise the titles in the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. "A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appear-
ance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities" is not comparable to
"Competence," for example, the title of Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules. More-
over, the preamble to the model code makes no reference to "titles" but ex-
pressly states that "the text of the Canons ... is authoritative."
E. The Specter of Spector
In re Spector21 8 is often cited in discussions of the appearance of im-
propriety standard, largely on the eloquence of the dissenting opinion. In
that case, the New York Court of Appeals considered the conduct of a judge
who had appointed the sons of two other judges as guardians ad litem, re-
ceivers, and referees while those other judges were appointing his son to
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 2.
217. See Eileen C. Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 44
NO. 1 Judges' J. 7 (Winter 2005) ("Although the directive to avoid the appearance of impro-
priety has existed in the Model Code for decades, the provision has only been found in the
canon's title, not in its individual sections").
218. 392 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1979).
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similar positions. 219 The State Commission on Judicial Conduct had found
that the judge was aware of the appointments of his son being made by the
other judges although there was no "quidpro quo" understanding.220
The court stated "nepotism is to be condemned, and disguised nepo-
tism imports an additional component of evil because, implicitly conceding
that evident nepotism would be unacceptable, the actor seeks to conceal
what he is really accomplishing., 221 The court concluded "participation in
the pattern of cross appointments gave an appearance of impropriety, in
effect permitting the inference that each of the Judges involved was by this
means securing appointments for his own son., 2 22 The court stated, "Not-
withstanding the absence of proof of any actual or intended impropriety
there was thereby inescapably created a circumstantial appearance of im-
propriety.
223
The dissenting justice did not object to the Commission's enforcement
of the appearance of impropriety standard "where appropriate, 224 although
noting "the need to invoke the canon with great restraint. ''225 The dissent
stated that "[u]nderstandably, no Judge can respond with less than pride to
the flattering proposition that more may be expected of Judges than of ordi-
nary mortals. 226 The dissent argued, however, that the "'appearance of im-
propriety' concept is beset by legal and moral complexity. The concern is
with what can be a very subjective and often faulty public perception. 227
Indeed, lack of specificity as to what conduct makes a Judge vulnerable
to a charge of appearance of impropriety may bear serious due process
implications. Leaving the rules expected to be observed unidentified is
bound to burden our Judges with uncertainty as to whether what is ac-
ceptable today will be deemed aberrant tomorrow. Putting men and
women who have to judge the rights of others under such undeserved
stress tends to undermine their own sense of worth. Our legal system
should treat those who preside over it with more regard.228
The focus of the dissent's disagreement with the majority was that
there was no specific rule prohibiting judges from appointing other judges'
219. Id. Judge Spector had appointed the Judge Fine's son while Justice Fine appointed
Judge Spector's son eight times. Judge Spector appointed Judge Postel's son ten times while
Justice Postel appointed Judge Spector's son five times. Id. at 552-53.
220. Id. at 553.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 554.
223. Id. at 555. The judge was admonished.
224. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 556 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 555 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 557 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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family members, and custom allowed the personal preferences of the ap-
pointing judge to govern the selection of referees, guardians ad litem, and
others.
To apply a current perception of impropriety retrospectively as the basis
for the finding that acts that were once regarded as proper when per-
formed are now to be classified as improper is fundamentally wrong. To
do so exacts from the petitioner expiation for the legal community's
failure to have articulated and imposed a clearer standard in the past.229
However, the crux of the majority opinion was not that Judge Spector
had appointed the other judges' sons, 230 but that his appointments in combi-
nation with their appointments of his son would make reasonable people
believe that the three judges had agreed to avoid the restriction on nepotism
by a Strangers on a Train maneuver.23' Even assuming there was no agree-
ment or unspoken understanding, Judge Spector knew of the other judges'
appointments of his son and, therefore, should have known that an appear-
ance of cross nepotism would be created if he appointed their sons. The
appearance could easily have been avoided; the judge could simply have
appointed other attorneys.
The majority responded to the dissent's arguments:
Reluctance to impose a sanction in this case would be taken as reflecting
an attitude of tolerance of judicial misconduct which is all too often
popularly attributed to the judiciary. To characterize the canonical in-
junction against the appearance of impropriety as involving a concern
with what could be a very subjective and often faulty public perception
would be to fail to comprehend the principle. The community, and
surely the Judges themselves, are entitled to insist on a more demanding
standard .... It would ill befit the courts and the members of the judici-
ary to suggest that Judges are to be measured against no higher norm of
conduct than may at times and in some places unhappily have been per-
ceived as reflecting the mores of a judicial marketplace. 232
229. Id. at 556 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
230. Judges are in fact allowed to appoint other judges' family members in cases. See
New York Advisory Opinion 03-19, at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/Opinions/03-119_.htm.
231. In Alfred Hitchcock's classic 1952 movie, Bruno agrees to kill Guy's wife while
Guy agrees to kill Bruno's father (at least Bruno thinks Guy agreed to do so). Because Bruno
and Guy have no connection with each other, other than the chance encounter on the train,
and neither has any connection to the person they plan to kill, Bruno figures each will be rid
of a burden without the police being able to tie either to the crimes.
232. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 555. Even if the majority's decision is seen as cynical, that
cynicism has been more than borne out in the years after the decision in Spector by the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Holding judges to the highest standards of conduct is not flattery but
their part of the bargain in which the public has granted them independence.
At a time when judges are accused of being unaccountable, the judiciary
must be answerable to the public's ethical expectations. To counteract accu-
sations of arrogance, judges must be humble in ethical matters and eschew
any claims of entitlement. At a time when judges are defending their free-
dom to make decisions regardless of clamor by the public or pressure from
politicians, judges must demonstrate their commitment to maintaining pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and impartiality of those decisions by consid-
ering how the public might reasonably view their conduct. The appearance
of impropriety standard, both as a symbol and an enforcement tool, is an
essential component of that effort and perfectly comprehensible by a
thoughtful judge and readily embraced by an upright judge.
chronic scandals involving fiduciary appointments in New York that have resisted numerous
reforms. See Fiduciary Appointments in New York, A Report to Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye
and Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/gfs/igfiduciary.html.

